#恶意攻击手段 The chain of the Trust Wallet incident has been mapped out: the attacker started preparations at least as early as December 8, successfully implanted a backdoor on the 22nd, began transferring funds on Christmas Day, and ultimately stole over $6 million. The key point here is— the official version was compromised to serve as a hacker backdoor, indicating that the attack targeted the source code or the development process.

SlowMist's analysis points to the core issue: developer devices or code repositories have been compromised. What does this mean? It means that the "official channels" trusted by users have already been breached. The browser extension of version 2.68 was embedded with malicious code; users installed the genuine wallet, but the logic was fake—the defense line was broken from the source.

From on-chain signals, this type of supply chain attack is the hardest to defend against. Users cannot identify it through conventional means because code signatures, version numbers, and interfaces all appear legitimate. The only effective response is: when abnormal fund outflows are detected, quickly trace the on-chain addresses and block subsequent withdrawals through exchange blacklists— but this is already a case of closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.

The lesson is clear: do not assume official channels are absolutely secure. For key assets, there are no substitutes for multi-signature wallets, cold storage, and regular device scans.