Proposal bonds really work as an effective spam filter in DAO governance. They solve a key problem: how do you handle proposals that fail to gain community support?

Here's the mechanics: when a proposal doesn't reach quorum, the proposer's bond gets forfeited to the treasury. This creates an interesting dynamic—the community actually benefits financially from unsuccessful proposals. It's not a punishment exactly, more like a natural consequence of a failed initiative.

Take the recent case of a fund proposal to purchase ZEC. It simply couldn't reach the required quorum for passage. As a result, that proposal bond went straight into the treasury. Rather than seeing it as a loss, you could view it as a small revenue stream for the DAO. Even proposals that don't gain traction end up generating value for the collective.

This mechanism elegantly balances two needs: it discourages low-effort or spam-like proposals while ensuring the community has a financial stake in the outcome. Whether a proposal succeeds or fails, the DAO benefits—that's solid incentive design.