#稳定币市场发展 Recently revisiting the Cornell study, I have gained a clearer understanding of the relationship between stablecoins and bank deposits through data.

The core logic is quite straightforward: stablecoins have not triggered a large-scale outflow of deposits, and this fact alone overturns the panic rhetoric of the past few years. The underlying reason is that the "sticky deposits" constraint remains strong—mortgages, credit cards, direct salary payments, and this binding mechanism make the flow cost of consumer funds much higher than we initially expected.

But the truly noteworthy change lies in the role of competitive pressure. The existence of stablecoins itself creates a discipline constraint, forcing banks to raise deposit interest rates and improve operational efficiency. This is not destructive competition; rather, it is a push for the system to upgrade itself—banks can no longer rely on user inertia and must attract funds with more competitive pricing.

From the perspective of on-chain fund flows, the phenomena I observe are consistent with the paper’s conclusions: although the market cap of stablecoins is growing, there are no signs of large-scale bank deposit outflows. This indicates that the market is voting with its feet—most users still weigh convenience against yields, rather than blindly chasing "higher returns."

The real efficiency dividend lies in the reconstruction of underlying infrastructure—instant cross-border payments, atomic settlement, liquidity release—these are the long-term values of stablecoins. The introduction of the 《GENIUS Act》 to some extent confirms this direction, clarifying the regulatory framework, and also signifies that this round of financial system integration is a long-term trend.

In the short term, there will likely be many discussions about "risks," but from the data and logical perspective, banks and stablecoins are not mutually exclusive opposites; rather, they are a process of mutual constraint and co-evolution.