#恶意攻击手段 Another year, another quantum threat discussion. Bitcoin won't be cracked by 2026, but how many times have we heard that before?

In early stories, we've experienced too many "doomsday predictions"—the threat of mining centralization in 2012, the scaling debates in 2017, institutional entry panic in 2020. Each time, someone said blockchain was finished, and each time, we survived. The threat of quantum computing is similar, but this time it's a bit different—not due to the maturity of the technology itself, but because of the **time gap** for attacks.

Those experts are right; 90% of the quantum threat discussions are indeed marketing. But what about the remaining 10%? The most frightening part isn't the system collapse in 2026, but that someone is already "collecting now and decrypting later." Imagine hackers are currently stealing your exposed public key data, and when quantum computing matures in 10 years, they decrypt in bulk. This kind of attack has already been happening.

I've seen too many historical cases. For addresses holding large amounts of coins, 25-30% of BTC public keys are already exposed—this number warrants reflection. It's not that something will go wrong in 2026, but these coins are already in a "Schrödinger's risk" state. Address reuse, long-term wallet inactivity—these seemingly harmless habits become vulnerabilities in the face of new threats.

From a historical perspective, the smartest approach has never been to wait for a problem to erupt before responding. Early cold wallet users, multi-signature users, those who regularly migrate assets—they've already been implementing quantum-level protections. The current recommendations—using new addresses, upgrading wallets, migrating to quantum-resistant schemes—may sound like new topics, but they're just reiterations of old security principles.

The timeline is clear: the risk exists today, technological maturity is in the future, and preparation can only be done now.