Hyundai Motor threatened with a bomb! The perpetrators demand 13 Bitcoins or they will blow up the Seoul headquarters.

Hyundai Motor Group received a Bitcoin ransom threat letter last Friday (December 19), threatening to detonate bombs in two major office buildings in Seoul if it did not pay 13 Bitcoins (approximately 16.4 billion Korean Won). After receiving the report, the police urgently evacuated employees from the office buildings located in Jongno District's Yeonhui-dong and Seocho District's Yangjae-dong. SWAT teams, bomb disposal units, and search dogs quickly deployed to conduct a floor-by-floor search. After several hours of searching, it was confirmed to be a false alarm.

The Precise Calculation Behind the 16.4 Billion Won Ransom

The threatening email claimed that a terror attack would be detonated at 11:30 at the Yeonhui-dong building, and then proceed to Yangjae-dong to place a second bomb, while demanding Hyundai Motor to pay 13 Bitcoins. Based on the Bitcoin price at that time, 13 BTC was approximately equivalent to 16.4 billion won (about 1.2 million dollars). This figure was not set arbitrarily, but was a meticulously calculated ransom amount.

For a global company like Hyundai, 16.4 billion Korean won is not an astronomical figure; theoretically, the payment capability is sufficient, but the amount is large enough for criminals to gain substantial profits. More cunningly, the anonymity of Bitcoin makes tracking the flow of funds extremely difficult. Even if the company pays the ransom, the police find it hard to trace the ultimate beneficiaries, which is precisely the core reason why cryptocurrencies are favored by criminals.

The police received a report at 11:42, just 12 minutes before the detonation time claimed in the threatening letter. This timing was deliberately set to create panic, forcing companies to make decisions in a very short time. Hyundai chose to immediately evacuate employees and call the police, rather than pay the ransom, indicating that large enterprises have established procedures for responding to such threats. The police blocked surrounding roads and conducted repeated searches for several hours but found no explosives, ultimately confirming it was a false alarm.

Although there were no physical casualties, the evacuation process itself incurs significant costs. Thousands of employees in two office buildings were forced to interrupt their work, and the deployment of SWAT and bomb disposal teams consumed a large amount of public resources, while the surrounding road closures affected traffic. This method of crime, which is “cost-free and highly profitable,” is the fundamental reason for the proliferation of fake bomb threats.

South Korean companies caught in a series of ransomware storms this week

The ransomware attack on Hyundai is not an isolated incident, but rather one of a series of intimidation attacks faced by large South Korean companies this week. Just a day before Hyundai received the threat, a post appeared on the Kakao customer service forum claiming that explosives were planted in the Suwon headquarters of Samsung Electronics, the Kakao Banqiao campus, and the Naver office area, also accompanied by Bitcoin ransom content.

On December 17, KT also received threatening information through the subscription system, prompting the police to evacuate the Banqiao office building and conduct a thorough search, ultimately finding no explosives. Within just a week, all five major corporate groups in South Korea were targeted, indicating that this intensity exceeds the realm of coincidence. The police suspect that the same group is operating behind this, aiming to exploit panic to force companies to pay ransom.

Three Major Characteristics of the Crypto Ransom Wave in South Korea

Unified Modus Operandi: Anonymously using overseas mail servers to send threatening letters, demanding payment in Bitcoin, claiming to detonate bombs at any time; multiple incidents show a high degree of consistency in methods, indicating organized crime.

Precise Target Selection: Focus on representative Korean companies such as Hyundai Motor, Samsung Electronics, Kakao, Naver, and KT, which can create maximum panic and are also more likely to receive payments. The choice of targets is highly strategic.

Concentrated Outbreak of Attacks: Five major companies fell victim within a week, with an unusual intensity. This could be a strategic action by criminal organizations to test the response capabilities of Korean companies or to increase the success rate by exploiting the atmosphere of panic.

This type of coordinated attack pattern is not uncommon in global crypto extortion crime. Criminals launch attacks on multiple targets within a short period, betting that at least one company will pay out of panic. Even with a success rate of only 10%, it is still a huge profit for the criminals. Even more insidious is that once a company pays, the news spreads and triggers a copycat effect, attracting more criminals to join.

The correlation between Bitcoin price rise and the increase in cryptocurrency crime

With the price of Bitcoin rising from $40,000 to a peak of $100,000 this year, many countries around the world have reported an increase in crypto-related extortion and violent incidents. This year, a man in Russia entered an exchange and set off a smoke bomb, a residence in San Francisco was kidnapped by a fake delivery person demanding crypto assets, and the number of suspicious crypto transaction reports in South Korea has exceeded 36,000 this year.

This correlation is not accidental. The rise in Bitcoin prices has significantly increased criminal profits, with 13 BTC valued at around $520,000 at the beginning of the year, while the current value has exceeded $1.2 million. The cost of crime remains unchanged, but the potential profits have doubled, naturally attracting more criminals. In addition, the increase in Bitcoin prices has also heightened media exposure, leading many criminals who were previously unaware of cryptocurrencies to learn about this anonymous payment tool through news reports and subsequently apply it to criminal activities.

In recent times, South Korea has uncovered multiple cases of money laundering techniques used by “money exchange groups,” indicating that criminals continue to exploit the anonymity of cryptocurrency for intimidation or financial concealment. The so-called “money exchange groups” refer to underground organizations that provide services for converting cryptocurrency to fiat currency for criminals. They utilize complex mixing technologies and multi-layered transfers, making it almost impossible to trace the flow of funds. The maturity of this black industrial chain further lowers the technical threshold for crypto crime.

The Double-Edged Sword of Strengthened Regulation by the South Korean Government

Following the significant security incidents faced by CEX, the South Korean government has incorporated cryptocurrency exchanges into the same security regulations as banks, implementing a no-fault compensation system. In the event of a hacking or system failure, exchanges may face fines of up to 3% of their revenue. Although this strict regulation enhances user protection, it also leads to unintended consequences.

When cryptocurrency exchanges are forced to implement strict KYC (Know Your Customer) and AML (Anti-Money Laundering) measures, some users turn to decentralized exchanges or P2P trading, which are harder to regulate. Criminals exploit this regulatory blind spot to receive ransom through decentralized platforms, further increasing the difficulty of tracing.

The police are currently investigating the source of the threatening emails and comparing whether it is the same organization that recently threatened Samsung, KT, Kakao, and Naver. Officials reiterated that although this threat turned out to be a false alarm, such “cyber terror attacks” have already placed significant pressure on private enterprises and national security, and subsequent efforts will strengthen international cooperation to track down the behind-the-scenes perpetrators.

However, the difficulty of cross-border cooperation in investigations should not be underestimated. Threatening emails use overseas servers, and Bitcoin payment addresses may be registered in any country, with the criminals themselves possibly located in a third country. This type of cross-jurisdictional crime requires coordination among law enforcement agencies from multiple countries, and the process often takes months or even years.