#网络钓鱼与欺诈 Recently saw Wang Chun's comment, couldn't help but laugh and feel a bit upset. Verifying a private key with 500 BTC, and the hacker still "considerately" left 10 — behind this almost joke-like experience is the ongoing neglect of security across the entire ecosystem.

Thinking of the malicious code incident with Polymarket copy trading bots, I suddenly realize a harsh reality: risks never come only from technical vulnerabilities; more often, they stem from the temptation of "convenience." Those malicious packages hidden on GitHub may seem like developer issues on the surface, but fundamentally they reflect our blind trust in third-party tools.

Copy trading itself requires permissions—you need to configure APIs, import private keys, and even transfer funds to the bot. Each step is a decision point. This incident tells me: no matter how high the returns, you can't sell your private key. My current principle is simple—use an independent wallet for copy trading, keep funds only in the necessary amount, and never give any third-party program "full permissions."

And honestly, the Milk Sad incident in the $15 billion case makes me even more cautious. The weak random number generation logic is something ordinary users wouldn't even notice. This means some risks are simply unavoidable; the best we can do is regular checks and isolating assets in cold wallets—old-fashioned but effective methods.

No matter how tempting the copy trading profits, you must guard the critical point. This isn't paranoia; it's a necessary lesson for survival in this ecosystem.