The "infinite money" cycle of companies holding Bitcoin has come to a halt

For most of the recent market cycle, the strategy was very simple: stocks of companies holding Bitcoin always traded at a significant premium to their net asset value (NAV). Thanks to this, they could issue shares at high prices to buy BTC at lower prices, increasing the amount of Bitcoin per share—a financial loop dependent on one core factor: sustainable premium.

Why did the premium disappear?

This factor vanished when the price of Bitcoin weakened.

Glassnode data shows that the price of BTC fell below the 0.75 quantile since mid-November, leaving over 1/4 of the circulating supply at a loss.

The “Bitcoin Digital Asset Treasury” (DAT) group, with a market cap of about $68.3 billion, has declined 27% in one month and nearly 41% in the past three months, according to Artemis. Meanwhile, the price of Bitcoin only dropped about 13% and 16%.

The NAV premium—the foundation for the aggressive issuance strategy of MicroStrategy (now Strategy) and Metaplanet—has almost evaporated. Most DAT stocks now trade around or below 1.0x mNAV (market price after debt adjustment). When the premium turns into a discount, issuing shares to buy BTC becomes a value-destroying action.

For these stocks to return to their “premium asset” status, the market needs more than just a price bounce—it requires structural repairs in price, liquidity, and governance.

Issue One: Capital costs are too high

A technical rebound in BTC is not enough. Many DAT companies are “latecomers” and face very high average BTC purchase costs.

According to Galaxy Research, Metaplanet and Nakamoto (NAKA) have average cost prices above $107,000 per BTC. With BTC prices hovering around $90,000, they are facing significant mark-to-market losses.

This creates a “narrative burden”: trading above cost, they’re seen as smart asset allocators; trading below, they become distressed companies. Leverage in the model intensifies the decline—for example, Nakamoto shares have dropped over 83% in three months.

The premium can only return if Bitcoin not only recovers but also maintains stability above these “high water marks.”

Issue Two: Demand for leverage has disappeared

DAT stocks were once a way for investors to seek “high beta” exposure without using derivatives. But in a risk-off environment, the beta effect now only works on the downside.

Spot and futures trading volume dropped by another 204,000 BTC last week to about 320,000 BTC—the lowest liquidity of the cycle, according to CryptoQuant. With DAT trading at 0.9x NAV, institutional investors will choose spot ETFs like IBIT—with lower risk and cheaper fees.

For the premium to return, there must be signs of renewed risk appetite: positive funding rates, rising open interest, and the return of leverage demand—something ETFs do not provide.

Issue Three: From offense to defense

The era of “printing shares to buy BTC” is over. The market now demands safety. Strategy’s recent move to raise $1.44 billion to strengthen its balance sheet is a prime example. The focus has shifted from accumulation at any cost to protecting liquidity and survivability.

The premium will only return when the market believes the company will issue capital prudently and with discipline.

Final Issue: Concentration risk and MSCI index pressure

Strategy holds over 80% of the BTC held by the entire DAT group and accounts for about 72% of the market cap. This means the fate of the entire group is almost tied to the liquidity and index status of MicroStrategy itself.

The upcoming MSCI decision on whether to exclude DAT from major indices is critical. If MSTR is removed, passive inflows from benchmark funds will disappear, putting the entire DAT group at risk of permanently trading below NAV like closed-end funds.

Vuong Tien